David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 5 (1-4):284 – 294 (1962)
This article attempts to show that certain alternatives that have been proposed to the classical principle of induction are necessarily inferior to it. The simplest versions of these ?counter?inductionist? policies are logically inconsistent, and consistent formulations are less reliable than the straight principle of induction
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References found in this work BETA
Max Black (1954/1971). Problems of Analysis. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.
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