Defeasible Reasoning

Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518 (1987)
Abstract
There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    John L. Pollock (1991). Self-Defeating Arguments. Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.
    By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.

    View all 22 citations

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