David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518 (1987)
There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
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Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Rose (forthcoming). Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-39.
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
David Rose (2015). Persistence Through Function Preservation. Synthese 192 (1):97-146.
David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer (2015). Folk Mereology is Teleological. Noûs 49 (3):n/a-n/a.
Daniel Bonevac (2016). Defaulting on Reasons. Noûs 50 (3).
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