Identity theories

Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834 (2009)
Abstract
Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
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References found in this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316–337.
Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.

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