Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience

Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92 (2013)
Abstract
G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources available to physicalists.
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References found in this work BETA
Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
Karen Bennett (2011). By Our Bootstraps. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):27-41.
Paul Bloomfield (2006). Opening Questions, Following Rules. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 169.

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