Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 10 (1-4):196 – 203 (1967)
|Abstract||Some ordinary language philosophers, including Stanley Cavell, have attacked certain tendencies of traditional philosophers as follows. E.g., when we say that something looks red to us, we imply that we think it isn't really red. Thus we arc breaking a rule of language when we say that something looks red to us when we know it is red. And thus there is something logically wrong with the traditional attempt, to say that what justifies us in thinking that something is red is its looking red to us. In this article it is maintained that the ?implication? invoked above is a contingent relation having to do with what makes a fact noteworthy, and that the existence of this implication does not show that there is anything logically wrong with the traditional positions being attacked|
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