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- Jonathan Polimeni & Eric Schwartz (2002). Neural Representation of Sensory Data. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):207-208.In the target article Pylyshyn revives the spectre of the “little green man,” arguing for a largely symbolic representation of visual imagery. To clarify this problem, we provide precise definitions of the key term “picture,” present some examples of our definition, and outline an information-theoretic analysis suggesting that the problem of addressing data in the brain requires a partially analogue and partially symbolic solution. This is made concrete in the ventral stream of object recognition, from V1 to IT cortex.No categories
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Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples of how this (...)


