Plans And Decisions

Theory and Decision 57 (2):79-107 (2004)
Counterexamples are constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of rational decision-making. An alternative called “locally global planning” is proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making becomes a non-terminating process without a precise target rather than a terminating search for an optimal solution
Keywords AI  alternatives  optimality  plans  rationality
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-004-7318-7
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1981). Causal Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael McDermott (2008). Are Plans Necessary? Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225 - 232.

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