David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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A rational agent (artificial or otherwise) residing in a complex changing environment must gather information perceptually, update that information as the world changes, and combine that information with causal information to reason about the changing world. Using the system of defeasible reasoning that is incorporated into the OSCAR architecture for rational agents, a set of reasonschemas is proposed for enabling an agent to perform some of the requisite reasoning. Along the way, solutions are proposed for the Frame Problem, the Qualification Problem, and the Ramification Problem. The principles and reasoning described have all been implemented in OSCAR.
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John L. Pollock & Iris Oved (2005). Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link. Noûs 39 (1):309-351.
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