David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):103 - 114 (1984)
Reliabilist theories propose to analyse epistemic justification in terms of reliability. This paper argues that if we pay attention to the details of probability theory we find that there is no concept of reliability that can possibly play the role required by reliabilist theories. A distinction is drawn between the general reliability of a process and the single case reliability of an individual belief, And it is argued that neither notion can serve the reliabilist adequately
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Berit Brogaard (2013). It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of 'Seems' and Seemings. Inquiry 56 (2-3):210-239.
Klemens Kappel (2006). A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):525 - 560.
J. D. Trout (1995). Diverse Tests on an Independent World. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):407-429.
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