Reliability and Justified Belief

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):103 - 114 (1984)
Reliabilist theories propose to analyse epistemic justification in terms of reliability. This paper argues that if we pay attention to the details of probability theory we find that there is no concept of reliability that can possibly play the role required by reliabilist theories. A distinction is drawn between the general reliability of a process and the single case reliability of an individual belief, And it is argued that neither notion can serve the reliabilist adequately
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    J. D. Trout (1995). Diverse Tests on an Independent World. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):407-429.
    Similar books and articles
    Jonathan Kvanvig (1986). How to Be a Reliabilist. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
    Robert Audi (2009). Reliability as a Virtue. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):43 - 54.
    Elizabeth Ring (1986). Goldman's Reliability Theory of Justified Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):501 – 507.
    Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 180--200.
    Alexander Jackson (2011). Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):564-593.
    Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    18 ( #78,273 of 1,088,398 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,398 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.