Rational choice and action omnipotence

Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23 (2002)
Counterexamples are constructed for the theory of rational choice that results from a direct application of classical decision theory to ordinary actions. These counterexamples turn on the fact that an agent may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform an action. An alternative theory of rational choice is proposed that evaluates actions using a more complex measure, and then it is shown that this is equivalent to applying classical decision theory to "conditional policies" rather than ordinary actions.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-111-1-1
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Brian Hedden (2012). Options and the Subjective Ought. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
Christy Mag Uidhir (2010). Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400.
Michael McDermott (2008). Are Plans Necessary? Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225 - 232.

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