Review of Drew Khlentozos' Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge
| Abstract | Drew Khlentozos’ Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This generosity and thoroughness are also the book’s main fault, as it is long (weighing in 408 pages) and sometimes plodding. In a few cases Khlentzos’ charity is overly generous. This seems to me to be the case, for example, with some of his contortions on behalf of Dummett, not least of which being a lengthy chapter on how intuitionism drives Dummett’s antirealism that probably should have been an appendix. But these are drawbacks that we can all live with—especially for the purpose of graduate teaching, for which this monograph is well suited. Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge begins (Section I) by setting out the realist/anti-realist debate. Khlentzos argues that the kinds of metaphysical realists who have been quickest to shrug off semantic arguments against realism are particularly susceptible to those arguments. Specifically, naturalistic realists—among whom Khlentzos counts himself—cannot dismiss critiques like those from Dummett and Putnam merely by observing that realism is a metaphysical rather than semantic or epistemic doctrine. The trouble is, “If the world is as resolutely mind-independent as the realist makes out, then there is a problem about how we get to know about it in the first place” (4). Khlentzos calls this the representation problem, saying. | |||||||||
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Bernd Carsten Stahl (forthcoming). Drew Khlentzos, Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge. Minds and Machines.
Thomas W. Polger (2005). Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge. The Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):181-183.
Guy Kahane (forthcoming). Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim? Journal of Moral Philosophy.
Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
Alexander Miller (2003). The Significance of Semantic Realism. Synthese 136 (2):191 - 217.
Clare McGraw (2007). The Realism/Anti-Realism Debate in Religion. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):254-272.
Drew Khlentzos, Semantic Challenges to Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anjan Chakravartty (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge University Press.
Trish Glazebrook (2001). Heidegger and Scientific Realism. Continental Philosophy Review 34 (4):361-401.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Drew Khlentzos (1991). On Putting the Semantic Cart Before the Metaphysical Horse - a Realistic Appraisal of Anti-Realist Semantics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):415 – 437.
David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50.
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