So you think you exist? — In defense of nolipsism
In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Springer (2006)
| Abstract | Human beings think of themselves in terms of a privileged non-descriptive designator — a mental “I”. Such thoughts are called “_de se_” thoughts. The mind/body problem is the problem of deciding what kind of thing I am, and it can be regarded as arising from the fact that we think of ourselves non-descriptively. Why do we think of ourselves in this way? We investigate the functional role of “I” (and also “here” and “now”) in cognition, arguing that the use of such non-descriptive “reflexive” designators is essential for making sophisticated cognition work in a general-purpose cognitive agent. If we were to build a robot capable of similar cognitive tasks as humans, it would have to be equipped with such designators | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJeffrey Bub (1994). Is Cognitive Neuropsychology Possible? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1:417-427.
John L. Pollock (2001). Evaluative Cognition. Noûs 35 (3):325–364.
Jenann Ismael (2011). Reflexivity, Fixed Points, and Semantic Descent; How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Reflexivity. Acta Analytica 26 (4):295-310.
John McCarthy (1996). Making Robots Conscious of Their Mental States. In S. Muggleton (ed.), Machine Intelligence 15. Oxford University Press.
Shoji Nagataki & Satoru Hirose (2007). Phenomenology and the Third Generation of Cognitive Science: Towards a Cognitive Phenomenology of the Body. Human Studies 30 (3):219 - 232.
John L. Pollock (2008). Irrationality and Cognition. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
John L. Pollock (1999). Rational Cognition in Oscar. Agent Theories.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads66 ( #13,603 of 549,014 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,014 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
