David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Direct inference derives values for definite (single-case) probabilities from those of related indefinite (general) probabilities. But direct inference is less useful than might be supposed, because we often have too much information, with the result that we can make conflicting direct inferences, and hence they all undergo collective defeat, leaving us without any conclusion to draw about the value of the definite probabilities. This paper presents reason for believing that there is a function — the Y- function — that can be used to combine different indefinite probabilities to yield a single value for the definite probability. Thus we get a kind of “computational” direct inference.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Matthew J. Donald, Probabilities for Observing Mixed Quantum States Given Limited Prior Information.
John Pollock (2011). Reasoning Defeasibly About Probabilities. Synthese 181 (2):317 - 352.
Richard Jeffrey (1996). Unknown Probabilities. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):327 - 335.
Manfred Jaeger (2005). A Logic for Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning. Synthese 144 (2):181 - 248.
Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
Joel Pust (2011). Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference. Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #149,989 of 1,792,039 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #139,057 of 1,792,039 )
How can I increase my downloads?