David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thinking and Reasoning 11 (1):5 – 33 (2005)
The explanation of the suppression of Modus Ponens inferences within the framework of linguistic pragmatics and of plausible reasoning (i.e., deduction from uncertain premises) is defended. First, this approach is expounded, and then it is shown that the results of the first experiment of Byrne, Espino, and Santamar a (1999) support the uncertainty explanation but fail to support their counterexample explanation. Second, two experiments are presented. In the first one, aimed to refute one objection regarding the conclusions observed, the additional conditional premise ( if N, C ) was replaced with a statement of uncertainty ( it is not certain that N ); the answers produced by the participants remained qualitatively and quantitatively similar in both conditions. In the second experiment, a fine-grained analysis of the responses to and justifications for an evaluation task was performed. The results of both experiments strongly supported the uncertainty explanation.
|Keywords||psychology of reasoning - defeasible reasoning - deduction - linguistic pragmatics|
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J. Baratgin, D. Over & G. Politzer (2014). New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables. Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84.
Guy Politzer (2007). Reasoning with Conditionals. Topoi 26 (1):79-95.
Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
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