Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):213-222 (2008)
|Abstract||Carl Gillett has defended what he calls the “dimensioned” view of the realization relation, which he contrasts with the traditional “flat” view of realization (2003, 2007; see also Gillett 2002). Intuitively, the dimensioned approach characterizes realization in terms of composition whereas the flat approach views realization in terms of occupiers of functional roles. Elsewhere we have argued that the general view of realization and multiple realization that Gillett advances is not able to discharge the theoretical duties of those relations (Shapiro 2004, unpublished manuscript; Polger 2004, 2007, forthcoming). Here we focus on an internal objection to Gillett’s account and then raise some broader reasons to reject it.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carl Gillett & Aizawa Kenneth (2009). Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. oxford university press.
Carl Gillett (2011). Multiply Realizing Scientific Properties and Their Instances. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):727-738.
Carl Gillett (2002). The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View. Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
Ronald P. Endicott (2011). Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
Sungsu Kim (2011). Multiple Realization and Evidence. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
Thomas W. Polger (2008). Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
Ronald P. Endicott (2010). Realization, Reductios, and Category Inclusion. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219.
Thomas W. Polger (2007). Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Lawrence Shapiro (2008). Understand the Dimensions of Realization. Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):213-222.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads93 ( #9,109 of 739,853 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,196 of 739,853 )
How can I increase my downloads?