Is public health paternalism really never justified? A response to Joel Feinberg
| Abstract | In the preeminent scholarly legal treatise on paternalism, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self, Joel Feinberg argues that hard paternalism is never justified because it is superfluous; all reasonable restriction of self-regarding conduct can be justified on (more palatable) soft paternalistic grounds. In this article, I argue that Feinberg's strategy seems to work only because he “stretches” soft paternalism to justify liberty limitation that is properly described as hard paternalism. I expose Feinberg's strained appeals, and argue for honesty and transparency regarding the bases for paternalistic liberty limitation. If the rationale for public health restrictions on liberty is hard paternalism, then that normative appeal should not be masked. Rather it should be made explicit so that it can be subjected to constructive criticism and debate. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Gerald Doppelt (1993). The Moral Limits of Feinberg's Liberalism. Inquiry 36 (3):255 – 286.
Dan W. Brock (1988). Paternalism and Autonomy:Harm to Self. Joel Feinberg; Paternalistic Intervention. Donald VanDeVeer. Ethics 98 (3):550-.
Thomas C. Leonard, Robert S. Goldfarb & Steven M. Suranovic (2000). New on Paternalism and Public Policy. Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):323-331.
J. Wilson (2011). Why It's Time to Stop Worrying About Paternalism in Health Policy. Public Health Ethics 4 (3):269-279.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads29 ( #42,388 of 549,084 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,228 of 549,084 )How can I increase my downloads? |

