David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 31 (1‐2):177-86 (1977)
Many writers, both scientists and philosophers, when discussing the mind‐body problem, adopt what might be called the physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world. They reject the possibility that the physical world is causally open to a realm of conscious experience that is not part of it.Among the upholders of such a view are those who may be called radical materialists or radical physicalists, who deny that there exists a realm of conscious experience. Also, there are the proponents of various identity theories, who admit that there is such a realm, but claim that it may be in some sense identified with parts of the physical world.There are, however, other writers who accept the physicalist principle, but who nevertheless also accept that there exists a genuinely autonomous realm of conscious experience. Such writers often hold some form of panpsychism or epiphenomenalism, and in what follows these two views are briefly explained and critically discussed
|Keywords||Biology Dualism Epiphenomenalism Panpsychism Physicalism Science Clifford, W Darwin|
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References found in this work BETA
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
K. Popper (1972). Philosophical Comments on Tarski's Theory of Truth. In Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press
Bernhard Rensch (1971). Biophilosophy. New York,Columbia University Press.
Bernhard Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie Auf Erkenntnistheoretischer Grundlage. Stuttgart, G. Fischer.
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