The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy: II

Review of Metaphysics 7 (2):307 - 322 (1953)
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Abstract

Mersenne's answer to Pyrrhonism begins with a great deal of bombast in his dedicatory letter to the king's brother. The sceptics are the enemies of science, they are unworthy of being called men. Since they cannot support the light of truth within themselves they try to limit all human knowledge to the outward appearance of things, and to reduce mankind to a state as lowly as the stupidest animals. The sceptics are the enemies of God and science. What Mersenne was seeking was a rational way of supporting simultaneously the truths of religion and of physics against the attacks of the Pyrrhonists and the Renaissance humanists. The only sceptic that Mersenne names is Sextus Empiricus. He probably had seen Gassendi's work since they had become friends around this time, and had joined forces in attacking the pernicious influence of the alchemist and Rosicrusian, Robert Fludd.

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