American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77 (2001)
|Abstract||A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications associated with utilitarianism while maintaining the compelling idea that it is never wrong to bring about the best outcome.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Schroeder (2007). Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'. Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Douglas W. Portmore (2003). Position‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation. Ethics 113 (2):303-332.
Douglas W. Portmore (1998). Can Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intuitions? Philosophical Studies 91 (1):1-19.
Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Relative Vs. Agent-Neutral. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley Blackwell.
Jennie Louise (2004). Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative. In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
Douglas W. Portmore (2001). McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction. Utilitas 13 (03):350-356.
Douglas W. Portmore (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):95–113.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads77 ( #12,770 of 722,700 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,438 of 722,700 )
How can I increase my downloads?