David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford Univ Pr (2011)
IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of actâ€consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism
|Keywords||consequentialism emandingness objection utilitarianism moral rationalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Behrends & Joshua DiPaolo (2016). Probabilistic Promotion Revisited. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1735-1754.
Similar books and articles
Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (December 2, 2010) in Moral Theories Edited by Jamie Dreier (Blackwell Publishers, 2006), Pp. 21-37. [REVIEW] In Dreier Jamie (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers
Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
Attila Tanyi (2012). The Case for Authority. In S. Schleidgen (ed.), Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness. Tectum 159-189.
Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Cowen (2006). The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (4):383.
Campbell Brown (2011). Consequentialize This. Ethics 121 (4):749-771.
Douglas W. Portmore (2011). 7 Consequentialism. In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum 143.
John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads546 ( #1,645 of 1,902,212 )
Recent downloads (6 months)66 ( #8,021 of 1,902,212 )
How can I increase my downloads?