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  • Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement. Furthermore, I argue that given that an act’s deontic status of both moral and non-moral reasons, the consequentialist must adopt dual-ranking act-consequentialism. I then defend dual-ranking act-consequentialism against a number of objections.
    Act- and Rule-Consequentalism in Normative Ethics
    Varieties of Utilitarianism in Normative Ethics
    Moral Reasons in Meta-Ethics
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
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  • 287.7Douglas W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Arguments for Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
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  • 272.6Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3).
    Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality (...) that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation, agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC against three objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc, (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible to make self-sacrifices that don’t make things worse for others, and (3) that it violates certain axioms of expected utility theory, viz., transitivity and independence. (shrink)
    Supererogation in Normative Ethics
    Act- and Rule-Consequentalism in Normative Ethics
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
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  • 236.7Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Arguments for Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Consequentialism and Teleology in Normative Ethics
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  • 220.3Douglas W. Portmore (2003). Position‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation. Ethics 113 (2).
    In this paper, I argue that maximizing act-consequentialism (MAC)—the theory that holds that agents ought always to act so as to produce the best available state of affairs—can accommodate both agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Thus I will show that MAC can accommodate the view that agents often have the moral option of either pursuing their own personal interests or sacrificing those interests for the sake of the impersonal good. And I will show that MAC can accommodate the idea that (...) certain acts are supererogatory in the sense of not being morally required even though they are what the agent has most moral reason to do. These two theses are surprising in themselves, but even more surprising is how I arrive at them. I argue that anyone generally concerned to accommodate, in some coherent fashion, our pre-theoretical moral intuitions at both the normative and meta-ethical levels will have to give a certain account of agent-centered options and supererogatory acts and that this account is the very one that allows for the maximizing act-consequentialist to accommodate both. So my paper will not only be of interest to those concerned with the tenability of consequentialism, but also to anyone interested in giving a coherent account of our pre-theoretical moral intuitions. (shrink)
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Supererogation in Normative Ethics
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  • 199.2Douglas W. Portmore, Moral Reasons, Overridingness, and Supererogation.
    In this paper, I present an argument that poses the following dilemma for moral theorists: either (a) reject at least one of three of our most firmly held moral convictions or (b) reject the view that moral reasons are morally overriding, that is, reject the view that moral reasons override non-moral reasons such that even the weakest moral reason defeats the strongest non-moral reason in determining an act’s moral status (e.g., morally permissible). I then argue that we should opt for (...) the second horn of this dilemma, in part because we should be loath to reject such firmly held moral convictions, but also because doing so allows us to dissolve an apparent paradox regarding supererogation. If I’m right, if non-moral reasons are relevant to determining what is and isn’t morally permissible, then it would seem that moral theorists have their work cut out for them. Not only will they need to determine what the fundamental right-making and wrong-making features of actions are (i.e., what moral reasons there are), but they will also need to determine what non-moral reasons there are and which of these are relevant to determining an act’s deontic status. And moral theorists will have to account for how these two very different sorts of reasons—moral and non-moral reasons—”come together” to determine an act’s deontic status. I will not attempt to do this work here, but rather only to argue that the work needs to be done. (shrink)
    Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
    Supererogation in Normative Ethics
    Moral Reasons in Meta-Ethics
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  • 196.7Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4).
    Draft of 11/9/07 Abstract: In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny (...) that moral reasons morally override nonmoral reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If I am right, if these moral theorists are committed to the view that nonmoral reasons are relevant to determining whether or not an act is morally permissible, then it would seem that they have their work cut out for them. Not only will they need to determine what moral reasons there are, but also what nonmoral reasons there are and which of these are relevant to determining an act’s moral status. Furthermore, they will need to account for how these two very different sorts of reasons—moral and nonmoral reasons—”come together” to determine an act’s moral status. I will not attempt to do this work here, but only to argue that the work needs to be done. (shrink)
    Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
    Moral Reasons in Meta-Ethics
    Supererogation in Normative Ethics
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  • 193.3Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.
    IN THIS CHAPTER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. I argue that this view compels us to accept consequentialism, but at the same time leads us to reject all traditional versions of the theory. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject what is, perhaps, the most traditional of all versions of consequentialism: utilitarianism.
    Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics
    Objections to Utilitarianism in Normative Ethics
    Demandingness of Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
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  • 164.0Daniel Jacobson (2008). Utilitarianism Without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill. Philosophical Review 117 (2).
    This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and (...) resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations. (shrink)
    John Stuart Mill in 19th Century Philosophy
    Utilitarianism in Normative Ethics
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  • 153.9Douglas W. Portmore (1998). Can Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intuitions? Philosophical Studies 91 (1).
    Consequentialism is usually thought to be unable to accommodate many of our commonsense moral intuitions. In particular, it has seemed incompatible with the intuition that agents should not violate someone's rights even in order to prevent numerous others from committing comparable rights violations. Nevertheless, I argue that a certain form of consequentialism can accommodate this intuition: agent-relative consequentialism--the view according to which agents ought always to bring about what is, from their own individual perspective, the best available outcome. Moreover, I (...) argue that the consequentialist's agent-focused account of the impermissibility of such preventive violations is more plausible than the deontologist's victim-focused account. Contrary to Frances Kamm, I argue that agent-relative consequentialism can adequately deal with single-agent cases, cases where an agent would have to commit one rights violation now in order to minimize her commissions of such rights violations over time. (shrink)
    Paradox of Deontological Constraints in Normative Ethics
    Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
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  • 150.2Bruno Verbeek (2008). Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
    This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected (...) as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice. (shrink)
    Objections to Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
    Rational Choice Theory in Philosophy of Social Science
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