David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they signiﬁcantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we ﬁnd evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to inﬂuence the beliefs of observers, we ﬁnd no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result.
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