Incompatibility Semantics from Agreement

Philosophia 40 (1):99-119 (2012)
In this paper, I discuss the analysis of logic in the pragmatic approach recently proposed by Brandom. I consider different consequence relations, formalized by classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, and I will argue that the formal theory developed by Brandom, even if provides powerful foundational insights on the relationship between logic and discursive practices, cannot account for important reasoning patterns represented by non-monotonic or resource-sensitive inferences. Then, I will present an incompatibility semantics in the framework of linear logic which allow to refine Brandom’s concept of defeasible inference and to account for those non-monotonic and relevant inferences that are expressible in linear logic. Moreover, I will suggest an interpretation of discursive practices based on an abstract notion of agreement on what counts as a reason which is deeply connected with linear logic semantics
Keywords Dialogues  Linear logic  Analytical pragmatism  Actions that count as reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9259-4
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A. S. Troelstra (1991). Lectures on Linear Logic. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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