Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):197-206 (2011)
Abstract
I discuss Ingmar Persson’s recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson’s argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection
Keywords Equality  Prioritarianism  Priority view  Persson  Parfit  Levelling down objection
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References found in this work BETA
Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.
Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.

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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.
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