Ranking judgments in arrow's setting
Synthese 173 (2) (2010)
| Abstract | In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002) and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesPhilippe Mongin (forthcoming). The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation Theory. Theory and Decision.
Christian List (2002). Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem. Theory and Decision 52 (3):287-301.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1/2):207 - 235.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
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