David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (4):382-414 (2012)
Rawls’s account of international toleration in The Law of Peoples has been the subject of vigorous critiques by critics who believe that he unacceptably dilutes the principles of his Law of Peoples in order to accommodate non-liberal societies. One important component in these critiques takes issue specifically with Rawls’s inclusion of certain non-liberal societies (‘decent peoples’) in the constituency of justification for the Law of Peoples. In Rawls’s defence, I argue that the explanation for the inclusion of decent peoples in the constituency of justification is not, as is standardly assumed, that they are the kind of societies that ought to be tolerated in that way on some prior conception of which kinds of societies ought to be tolerated in that way. The real explanation appeals to a methodological principle underlying Rawls’s approach to political justification, according to which liberals owe justification, as a matter of liberal principle, to those who comply with liberal principles for political institutions that apply to them. If such liberal principles can be complied with by agents who nevertheless cannot accept fully liberal justifications for those principles, then liberalism itself requires liberals to seek justifications which they can accept. This approach gives us a new way to view decent peoples: as just such agents, who are therefore owed a justification for the Law of Peoples that they can accept. Decency is thus a concept that is internal to liberal political justification at the international level. Reading Rawls in this way permits a coherent and attractive defence of his strategy of toleration and of his international theory as a whole
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mitchell Avila (2007). Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (1):87 - 124.
Blain Neufeld (2005). Civic Respect, Political Liberalism, and Non-Liberal Societies. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (3):275-299.
Brian E. Butler (2001). There Are Peoples and There Are Peoples: A Critique of Rawls' Law of Peoples. Florida Philosophical Review 1 (2):1-24.
Walter Riker (2004). Rawls's Decent Peoples and the Democratic Peace Thesis. Social Philosophy Today 20:137-153.
Martha Nussbaum (2002). Women and the Law of Peoples. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):283-306.
Samuel Freeman (2006). The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice. Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (1):29-68.
Michael Blake (2002). Toleration and Reciprocity: Commentary on Martha Nussbaum and Henry Shue. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):325-335.
Christopher Heath Wellman (2012). Reinterpreting Rawls's the Law of Peoples. Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):213-232.
Tarek Hayfa (2004). The Idea of Public Justification in Rawls's Law of Peoples. Res Publica 10 (3):233-246.
Henry Shue (2002). Rawls and the Outlaws. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):307-323.
David A. Reidy (2010). Human Rights and Liberal Toleration. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (2):287-317.
Chris Naticchia (2005). The Law of Peoples: The Old and the New. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (3):353-369.
David A. Reidy (2007). A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (2):193 - 236.
Added to index2012-02-15
Total downloads93 ( #37,261 of 1,777,121 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #32,926 of 1,777,121 )
How can I increase my downloads?