David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93 (2012)
This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More importantly, the basic reasons dilemma focuses our attention on the central problems that afflict coherentist views of basic beliefs. By reflecting on the basic reasons dilemma, I formulate three desiderata that any viable coherentist account of basic beliefs must satisfy. I argue that the account on offer satisfies these desiderata
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Laurence Bonjour (1997). Haack on Justification and Experience. Synthese 112 (1):13-23.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
Citations of this work BETA
William G. Lycan (2012). Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again). Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
William Roche (2012). Witness Agreement and the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherentist Justification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):151-169.
William Roche (2013). On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence. Erkenntnis:1-19.
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