Know how to be Gettiered?

Abstract
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's influential article "Knowing How" argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different than knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response. however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,101
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Citations of this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2011). Knowing (How). Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.
J. Adam Carter (2012). On Stanley's Intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):749-762.
Similar books and articles
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):15-28.
Josefa Toribio (2008). How Do We Know How? Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.
Anna Mahtani (2008). Williamson on Inexact Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Ellen Fridland (2012). Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):n/a-n/a.
Stephen R. Grimm (2006). Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-09

Total downloads

11 ( #144,149 of 1,102,122 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #128,850 of 1,102,122 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.