David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747 (2009)
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's influential article "Knowing How" argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different than knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Nolan (2008). Properties and Paradox in Graham Priest's "Towards Non-Being". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):191 - 198.
Austen Clark (2008). Classes of Sensory Classification: A Commentary on Mohan Matthen, "Seeing, Doing, and Knowing". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):400 - 406.
Ted Poston (2007). Nicholas Rescher: Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition. Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):361-363.
Ted Poston (2007). Nicholas Rescher: Common-Sense. Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):361-363.
Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
Stephen R. Grimm (2006). Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
Ted Poston (2008). Justification Without Awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):570-573.
Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
E. J. Coffman (2010). Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #41,848 of 1,413,402 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #26,433 of 1,413,402 )
How can I increase my downloads?