|Abstract||. In whatever form, terminal philosophy holds that some matters are so fundamental that they are presupposed in any practice of reason-giving; accordingly, if reason-giving were applied to such matters in order to justify them, or even to criticize, then the very attempt to do so would necessarily assume what is at issue, a fatal circularity . No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality ; rational reason-giving must terminate|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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