Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria
Kluwer Academic (1999)
|Abstract||What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons.|
|Keywords||Normativity (Ethics Decision making Moral and ethical aspects|
|Buy the book||$128.93 new (28% off) $179.00 direct from Amazon $211.37 used Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1458.3.P67 1999|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
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