Abstraction by recarving

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):327–338 (2001)
Abstract Explains why Bob Hale's proposed notion of weak sense cannot explain the analyticity of Hume's principle as he claims. Argues that no other notion of the sort Hale wants could do the job either.
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    Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2009). The Metaontology of Abstraction. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
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