Abstraction by recarving

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):327–338 (2001)
Explains why Bob Hale's proposed notion of weak sense cannot explain the analyticity of Hume's principle as he claims. Argues that no other notion of the sort Hale wants could do the job either.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00034.x
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Matti Eklund (2006). Neo-Fregean Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.

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Similar books and articles
Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2009). The Metaontology of Abstraction. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press
Bob Hale (2006). The Limits of Abstraction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):223–232.
Bob Hale (2000). Reals by Abstraction. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):100--123.
Bob Hale (2001). A Response to Potter and Smiley: Abstraction by Recarving. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):339–358.
Michael Potter & Timothy Smiley (2002). Recarving Content: Hale's Final Proposal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):301–304.

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