Abundant truth in an austere world
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||What is real? Less than you might think. We advocate austere metaphysical realism—a form of metaphysical realism claiming that a correct ontological theory will repudiate numerous putative entities and properties that are posited in everyday thought and discourse, and also will even repudiate numerous putative objects and properties that are posited by well confirmed scientific theories. We have lately defended a specific version of austere metaphysical realism which asserts that there is really only one concrete particular, viz., the entire cosmos (see Horgan and Potrč (2000, 2002), Potrč (2003)). But there are various potential versions of the generic position we are here calling austere metaphysical realism; and it is the generic view that constitutes the ontological part of the overall approach to realism and truth that we will describe here.|
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Added to index2009-01-28
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