David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 19 (33):163-187 (2004)
Moral particularism is a promising new approach which understands itself as a subchapter of holism in the theory of reasons. So particularism may be extended to other areas, such as metaphysics. One of the bases for this kind of move is elaborated by particularism itself as resultance, a strategy for providing the relevant basis that is opposed to various forms of generalism (the thin property of goodness is constituted by several thick properties, such as being good humoured, being pleasant; the property of this being a table is constituted from properties of there being four legs, a plate, a certain arrangement). It is claimed that resultance or emergence needs a background structure in order to get off the ground.
|Keywords||particularism resultance emergence supervenience reasons holism thin and thick properties|
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