Transvaluationism, common sense and indirect correspondence

Acta Analytica 17 (1):101-119 (2002)
The problem of reconciling the philosophical denial of ontological vagueness with common-sense beliefs positing vague objects, properties and relations is addressed. This project arises for any view denying ontological vagueness but is especially pressing for transvaluationism, which claims that ontological vagueness is impossible. The idea that truth, for vague discourse and vague thought-content, is an indirect form of language-thought correspondence is invoked and applied. It is pointed out that supervaluationism provides one way, but not necessarily the only way, of implementing the idea of indirect correspondence.
Keywords Vagueness  Transvaluationism  Truth  Indirect correspondence  Common sense
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-002-1007-3
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References found in this work BETA
Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin (1995). Distinctions Without a Difference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.
R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Concepts Without Boundaries. In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press 186-205.
Terence Horgan (1994). Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.

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