Madness versus badness: The ethical tension between the recovery movement and forensic psychiatry [Book Review]

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):93-105 (2010)
Abstract
The mental health recovery movement promotes patient self-determination and opposes coercive psychiatric treatment. While it has made great strides towards these ends, its rhetoric impairs its political efficacy. We illustrate how psychiatry can share recovery values and yet appear to violate them. In certain criminal proceedings, for example, forensic psychiatrists routinely argue that persons with mental illness who have committed crimes are not full moral agents. Such arguments align with the recovery movement’s aim of providing appropriate treatment and services for people with severe mental illness, but contradict its fundamental principle of self-determination. We suggest that this contradiction should be addressed with some urgency, and we recommend a multidisciplinary collaborative effort involving ethics, law, psychiatry, and social policy to address this and other ethical questions that arise as the United States strives to implement recovery-oriented programs.
Keywords Recovery movement  Bioethics  Psychiatry  Social policy  Moral agency
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,819
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
James F. Drane (1985). The Many Faces of Competency. Hastings Center Report 15 (2):17-21.

View all 6 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-03-20

Total downloads

39 ( #46,629 of 1,099,961 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #66,994 of 1,099,961 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.