On assigning rights to animals and nature
Environmental Ethics 2 (1):67-71 (1980)
| Abstract | Watson argues that living entities do not have intrinsic or primary rights, such as the right to existence, unless they are capable of fulfilling reciprocal duties in a self-conscious manner. I suggest that (1) Watson’s “reciprocity framework” for rights and duties is excessively anthropocentric, (2) that it is founded on the incorrect assumption that the Golden Rule refers to mutual rather than individual duties, and (3) that Watson arbitrarily equates moral rights with primary rights. Since “intrinsic” rights are, in effect, assigned rights, the assignment of rights to a given entity is viewed as a function of its perceived value. Thus, in emphasizing differences between man and other living entities, Watson chooses Cartesian values in assigning rights. Conversely, the ecological and evolutionary relatedness of living things forms the basis for considering rights within the naturalist tradition | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesErol Kuyurtar (2007). Are Cultural Group Rights Against Individual Rights? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:51-59.
Joel Marks (2010). Live Free or Die. [REVIEW] Animal Law 17 (1):243-250.
Aaron Simmons (2007). A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):267-278.
W. J. Talbott (2010). Human Rights and Human Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
Seumas Miller (2000). Collective Rights and Minority Rights. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):241-257.
Terrance McConnell (1984). The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights. Law and Philosophy 3 (1):25 - 59.
Hugh V. McLachlan (2010). Moral Rights to Life, Both Natural and Non-Natural: Reflections on James Griffin's Account of Human Rights. Diametros 26:58-76.
Roland C. Clement (1979). Watson's Reciprocity of Rights and Duties. Environmental Ethics 1 (4):353-355.
Richard A. Watson (1979). Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature. Environmental Ethics 1 (2):99-129.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads3 ( #201,838 of 549,060 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,060 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
