David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256 (2010)
Starting from the special theory of relativity it is argued that the structure of an experience is extended over time, making experience dynamic rather than static. The paper describes and explains what is meant by phenomenal parts and outlines opposing positions on the experience of time. Time according to he special theory of relativity is defined and the possibility of static experience shown to be implausible, leading to the conclusion that experience is dynamic. Some implications of this for the relationship of phenomenology to the physical world are considered.
|Keywords||Temporal consciousness Free will Physical theory and consciousness Specious Present|
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Citations of this work BETA
Oliver Rashbrook (2013). An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
Sean Enda Power (2013). Perceiving External Things and the Time-Lag Argument. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
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