Abstract

This project has two connected goals: to analyze formal and non-formal aspects of Kant's ethics and thereby to offer a new understanding of his contributions to ethical theory. Philosophers generally have viewed Kant's ethical theory as the paradigm for formalism in ethics, exemplified in his universalizability test for maxims. Most of the criticisms of Kant turn on this standard interpretation. The formalist interpretation of Kant is neither entirely accurate nor charitable, given his ambivalence in the pre-Critical and Critical works and the logical difficulties inherent in universalization. Moreover, the formalist interpretation neglects Kant's subtle and compelling non-formal theory of value, for which I argue. ;The first chapter is an exegesis of the relevant texts: the pre-Critical essays, the first Critique, the Groundwork, second Critique, and Metaphysics of Morals. Kant's early works reveal both formalist and phenomenalist tendencies. This ambivalence is confronted, but not resolved, in the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative: the formula of the Universal Law and the formula of the End-in-itself. Kant's later writings on ethics only bring tension to the sustained ambivalence of his views. Many modern commentators have wanted to resolve this tension in favor of the formalist interpretation. The second chapter considers these formalist reconstructions of Kant's views in the German- and English-language literature. The third chapter explores the possibilities for a formal theory of willing based on Kantian universalization. I suggest formal models for both monotonic and non-monotonic universalization mechanisms and criticize them in turn. The fourth chapter addresses objections to Kant based on Max Scheler's Formalismus in der Ethik. We focus on Scheler's attacks concerning Kant's moral psychology, value-empiricism, and the notion of Gesinnung. My last chapter presents a resolution of these problems and suggests a revised ethic based on the Kantian values of impartiality, freedom, and dignity, now understood in a non-formal sense. I conclude by showing that an immanent Kantian ethic obviates the need for Kant's formalistic answer to the problem of freedom in the first two Critiques.