British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):457-486 (2012)
|Abstract||The dominant view in the cognitive science of religion (the ‘Standard Model’) is that religious belief and behaviour are not adaptive traits but rather incidental byproducts of the cognitive architecture of mind. Because evidence for the Standard Model is inconclusive, the case for it depends crucially on its alleged methodological superiority to selectionist alternatives. However, we show that the Standard Model has both methodological and evidential disadvantages when compared with selectionist alternatives. We also consider a pluralistic approach, which holds that religion or various aspects of religion originated as byproducts of evolved cognitive structures but were subsequently co-opted for adaptive purposes. We argue that when properly formulated, the pluralistic approach also has certain advantages over the Standard Model|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Bence Nanay (2002). Evolutionary Psychology and the Selectionist Model of Neural Development: A Combined Approach. Evolution and Cognition.
T. Button & P. Smith (2012). The Philosophical Significance of Tennenbaum's Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (1):114-121.
Richard Jonathan Sagar, The Cognitive Science of Religion/Atheism and its Impact on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology.
Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz (2011). Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief From Cognitive Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.
A. Feduzi, J. Runde & C. Zappia (2012). De Finetti on the Insurance of Risks and Uncertainties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):329-356.
Kei Yoshida (2007). Defending Scientific Study of the Social: Against Clifford Geertz (and His Critics). Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):289-314.
Glenn Carruthers (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515 - 520.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd (2009). Varieties of Support and Confirmation of Climate Models. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
Timothy J. Bayne (2001). The Inclusion Model of the Incarnation: Problems and Prospects. Religious Studies 37 (2):125-141.
Aku Visala (forthcoming). Religion and the Human Mind: Philosophical Perspectives on the Cognitive Science of Religion. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 50 (2).
Andreas Blass (1981). The Model of Set Theory Generated by Countably Many Generic Reals. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):732-752.
Ivo DÜntsch, Gunther Schmidt & Michael Winter (2001). A Necessary Relation Algebra for Mereotopology. Studia Logica 69 (3):381 - 409.
Mauro Adenzato (2000). Gene-Culture Coevolution Does Not Replace Standard Evolutionary Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):146-146.
Carole J. Lee (2007). The Representation of Judgment Heuristics and the Generality Problem. Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society:1211-6.
Added to index2012-01-03
Total downloads68 ( #15,773 of 722,871 )
Recent downloads (6 months)45 ( #1,565 of 722,871 )
How can I increase my downloads?