David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132 (2012)
The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, so long as we are clear about what the doctrine is really saying, we can make perfect sense of the specious present doctrine.
|Keywords||The Specious Present Perception of Time Conceptions of the specious present Perception of Change|
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References found in this work BETA
William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Michael Tooley (2000). Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
D. H. Mellor (1998). Real Time Ii. Routledge.
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Sean Enda Power (2015). Perceiving Multiple Locations in Time: A Phenomenological Defence of Tenseless Theory. Topoi 34 (1):249-255.
Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
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