Inquiry 37 (4):487 – 494 (1994)
|Abstract||The theme of these notes is the relation between verificationism and Quine's approach to philosophy of language. The main thesis is that a tenable theory of meaning along verificationist lines must distinguish between canonical and indirect verification and that this distinction is related to observable features of language use. It is argued that a theory of meaning along such lines is not vulnerable to Quine's arguments against verificationism, and suggested that, on the whole, a verificationism of this kind is compatible with Quine's basic approach to philosophy of language|
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