David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 32 (September):277-303 (1989)
One foundation of Eliminative Materialism is the claim that the totality of our ordinary resources for explaining and predicting behaviour, ?Folk Psychology?, constitutes a theoretical scheme, potentially in conflict with other theories of behaviour. Recent attacks upon this claim, as well as the defence by Paul Churchland, are examined and found to be lacking in a suitably realistic conception of theory. By finding such a conception, and by correctly identifying the level of conceptual structures within which Folk Psychology is located, the original claim is reinforced
|Keywords||Behavior Psychology Science Churchland, P|
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Achinstein (1968). Concepts of Science. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press.
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Paul Churchland (1985). Conceptual Progress and Word/World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):1-17.
Paul M. Churchland (1986). Cognitive Neurobiology: A Computational Hypothesis for Laminar Cortex. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 1 (1):25-51.
Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
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