David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):229-254 (2012)
On some theories of rights, such as the Choice theory, only agents can have moral rights. The realm of right-holders thus excludes several potential candidates, among which are young children, mentally incapacitated persons, and groups since these are thought to lack the required degree of agency. This paper argues that groups can be right-holders. The argument comes in three steps: first, it is argued that full-blown or autonomous agency is not required for the possession of Choice theory rights, second, that groups can be seen as agents, albeit in a limited sense, and third, that groups can make irreducibly collective choices in spite of their limited agency. The upshot of this argument is that groups can have rights, provided that they are organized around a coherent decision-making procedure; furthermore, this account can be employed to argue that other creatures of limited agency are possible right-holders.
|Keywords||collective choice agency responsibility group rights Choice theory of rights|
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Citations of this work BETA
Adina Preda (2015). Rights: Concept and Justification. Ratio Juris 28 (3):408-415.
Frank Hindriks (2014). How Autonomous Are Collective Agents? Corporate Rights and Normative Individualism. Erkenntnis 79 (9):1565-1585.
Andrew Shorten (2015). Are There Rights to Institutional Exemptions? Journal of Social Philosophy 46 (2):242-263.
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