Indexicality, intensionality, and relativist post-semantics

Synthese 184 (2):121-136 (2012)
This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between meaning and truth
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9728-0
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John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

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