Opacity, belief and analyticity

Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306 (1992)
Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in virtue of meaning alone? The paper closes by hinting at an account of analyticity from an externalist perspective
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00646411
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1984). De Re Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.
Colin McGinn (1982). Rigid Designation and Semantic Value. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):97-115.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Consuelo Preti (1995). Externalism and Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):213 - 236.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

59 ( #57,882 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,688 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.