Quality instances and the structure of the concrete particular

Axiomathes 15 (2):267-292 (2005)
Abstract
In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects.
Keywords abstract particulars  concrete particulars  J. P. Moreland  ontology  part–whole relation  properties  quality instances  realism  universals
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jeffrey E. Brower, Medieval Theories of Relations. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Etienne Gilson (1952). Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

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