David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 148 (1):5 - 29 (2006)
This essay presents an argument against the token-reflexive approach to the semantics for indexical languages. After some preliminary remarks in section one, sections two and three explain why some traditional arguments against token-reflexivity are ultimately ineffective. Section four puts forth a more persuasive argument, to the effect that token-reflexive views overgenerate with respect to results of analyticity. However, as section five explains, defenders of the alternative, type-oriented view have all too often wasted the advantage offered by their approach: the unmotivated, independent restriction of semantic evaluation to so-called ‘proper’ indexes is responsible for undesirable conclusions, similar to those to which token- reflexive theorists are committed.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Hans Reichenbach (1980). Elements of Symbolic Logic. Dover Publications.
Philippe Schlenker (2003). A Plea for Monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
John Perry (1997). Indexicals and Demonstratives. In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell 486--612.
Citations of this work BETA
Erich Rast (2013). On Contextual Domain Restriction in Categorial Grammar. Synthese 190 (12):2085-2115.
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