Graduate studies at Western
Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84 (2008)
|Abstract||In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.|
|Keywords||Representationalism Higher-order theories of consciousness Mind-reading abilities|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alex Byrne (2004). What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-Order Consciousness and Phenomenal Space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).
Peter Carruthers (2004). Hop Over FOR, HOT Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
Peter Carruthers (2003). Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel (2006). An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.
Michael Tye (2009). Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
Vincent Picciuto (2011). Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):3 - 4.
Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
Isabel Gois (2010). A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum.
Peter Carruthers (2005). Reply to Shriver and Allen. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.
Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-Order Intentionalism and Higher-Order Acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
Peter Carruthers (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.
John O'Dea (2007). A Higher-Order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. The Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):29-41.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads47 ( #27,355 of 739,319 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #6,454 of 739,319 )
How can I increase my downloads?