An anti-realist account of mathematical truth

Synthese 57 (1):49 - 65 (1983)
The paper gives a semantics for naive (inconsistent) set theory in terms of substitutional quantification. Soundness is proved in an appendix. In the light of this construction, Several philosophical issues are discussed, Including mathematical necessity and the set theoretic paradoxes. Most importantly, It is argued, These semantics allow for a nominalist account of mathematical truth not committed to the existence of a domain of abstract entities
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064067
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.
Willard Quine (1976). Whither Physical Objects? In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel 497--504.

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