An anti-realist account of mathematical truth

Synthese 57 (1):49 - 65 (1983)
Abstract
The paper gives a semantics for naive (inconsistent) set theory in terms of substitutional quantification. Soundness is proved in an appendix. In the light of this construction, Several philosophical issues are discussed, Including mathematical necessity and the set theoretic paradoxes. Most importantly, It is argued, These semantics allow for a nominalist account of mathematical truth not committed to the existence of a domain of abstract entities
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,330
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
J. L. Bell (1981). Category Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):349-358.
Kurt Gödel (1947). What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? In Solomon Feferman, John Dawson & Stephen Kleene (eds.), Kurt Gödel: Collected Works Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press. 176--187.
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

28 ( #59,395 of 1,096,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #253,460 of 1,096,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.