An anti-realist account of mathematical truth

Synthese 57 (1):49 - 65 (1983)
The paper gives a semantics for naive (inconsistent) set theory in terms of substitutional quantification. Soundness is proved in an appendix. In the light of this construction, Several philosophical issues are discussed, Including mathematical necessity and the set theoretic paradoxes. Most importantly, It is argued, These semantics allow for a nominalist account of mathematical truth not committed to the existence of a domain of abstract entities
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    References found in this work BETA
    J. L. Bell (1981). Category Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):349-358.
    Kurt Gödel (1947). What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? In Solomon Feferman, John Dawson & Stephen Kleene (eds.), Kurt Gödel: Collected Works Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press. 176--187.
    Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.

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